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122 S. Ct. 1843 (2002)
L Facs
On August 9,1980, Gary Bradford Cone ("Cone") began a two-daycrime
spree through Memphis, Tennessee.' After robbing a jewelry store, Cone led
police on a high speed chase that ended when Cone abandoned his car in a
residential neighborhood.2 While fleeing from the police, one shot a pursuing
police officer and a bystander, attempted to shoot a third individual, and de-
manded that the third individual give up his car to Cone? The next day, Cone
broke into the home of Shipley and Cleopatra Todd. He beat and mutilated the
Todds, killing them both.4
A Tennessee jury found Cone guilty of two counts of first-degree murder
in the perpetration of a burglary, three counts of assault with intent to murder,
and one count of robbery with a deadly weapon.' At the sentencing hearing on
the first-degree murder charges, Cone's counsel gave an opening statement and
cross-examined the prosecution's witness.6 He did not present mitigating
evidence and he waived his dosing argument! Under Tennessee law, the jury
was required to impose a death sentence on a first-degree murder charge if it
unanimously found beyond a reasonable doubt that the prosecution proved at
least one aggravating circumstance that was not outweighed by a mitigating
circumstance! The jury found that the State proved two aggravating factors for
each of the murder charges and that no mitigating circumstances outweighed
them.9
On appeal, the Supreme Court of Tennessee affirmed the convictions and
death sentence. 0 In his petition for post-conviction relief, Cone argued that his




5. Bellv. Cone, 122 S. O. 1843,1847-48 (2002); saeTENN. CCDE ANN. S 39-2-202 (1982)
(identiyg murder in perpetration of burglary as first-degree murder, punishable by life
imprisonment or death).
6. Bd4 122 S. Gt. at 1848.
7.- Id
8. Id;soeTENN. CODE ANN. S 39-2-203(W (1982) (setting forth situations in whichjuryshall
impose sentence of death).
9. Bd4 122 S. C. at 1848-49.
10. Ca, 665 S.W.2d at 96.
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counsel rendered ineffective assistance at the sentencing hearing." A division of
the Tennessee Criminal Court denied Cone relief onthis claim.'2 The Tennessee
Court of Cximinal Appeals found that Cone's attorney provided competent
representation under the standards set forth in Baxer v Rcas 3 and Sti&kvri v
WashbitCw and affirmed the denial of relief."a The Supreme Court of Tennessee
denied Cone permission to appeal, and the United States Supreme Court denied
certiorari. 6
Cone filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus under 28 U.S.C S 2254 in
the United States District Court for the Western District of Tennessee at Mem-
phis.7 The federal district court denied his petition on the ground that he did
not meet the requirements of S 2254(d). 8 The United States Court of Appeals
for the Sixth Cicuit affirmed the denial of the writ as to Cone's conviction, but
reversed as to his sentence.' The Sixth Caruit found that UnitaiStiat v Crnii? °
should have been applied to Cone's ineffective assistance of counsel claim, and
thus the Tennessee Crminal Court's use of Strideaiconstituted an unreasonable
11. M4 122 S. . at 1849.
12. Id
13. 523 S.W2d 930 (Tenn. 1975).
14. 466 US. 668 (1984).
15. Cone v. State, 747 S.W.2d 353,356-58 (Tean. Crim. App. 1987); swBaxter v. Rose, 523
S.W.2d 930, 936 (Tean. 1975) (setting forth a state standard for analyzing ineffective assistance of
counsel claims); Strickland v. Washington, 466 US. 668, 688, 694 (1984) (staring a two-part test for
determining whether a defendant's counselprovided such ineffective assistance that the defendant's
conviction or sentence should be reversed). The Supreme Court of Tennessee deemed the &A=tr
standard for determining competency of representation in ineffective assistance of counsel claims
to be the sameasthe standard found in SiL Bd 122 S. Ct. at 1849.
16. Bd4 122 S. Q. at 1849; one v. Tennessee, 488 US. 871,871 (1988) (mem)(denying writ
of certioraro.
17. Bd 122 S. C. at 1849; sf28 US.C. S 2254 (2000) (setting forth evidentiaryrequirenents
for writ of habeas corpus; part of the Ani-Terrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996).
18. Bd 122 S. C. at 1849; sw 28 US.C. S 2254(d). Section 2254(d) reads:
(d) An application for a writ of habeas corpus on behalf of a person in custody
pursuant to the judgment of a State court shallnot be granted with respect to anyclaim
that was adjudicated on the merits in State court proceedings unless the adjudication
of the claim--
(1) resulted in a decision that was contraryto, or involved an unreasonable application
of, clearlyestablished Federal law, as determined bythe Supreme Court of the United
States; or
(2) resulted in a decision that was based on an unreasonable determination of the facts
in the light of the evidence presented in the state court proceeding.
28 USC. S 2254(d).
19. B!4 122 S. CL at 1849; Cone v. Bell, 243 F.3d %1, 979 (6th Cr. 2001).
20. 466 US. 648 (1984).
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application of established law.21 The United States Supreme Court granted
certiorari 2
Cone argued that the state court's denial of his appal was contrary to
applicable federal law because the court applied the wrong legal rule to his claim
of ineffective assistance of counsel. 2 He claimed that the state court mistakenly
applied the law of Strideami because Cunrc should have governed the court's
analysis of his claim" ' Cone alleged that this misapplication of law constituted
grounds for habeas relief under S 2254(d). 5 The Court undertook a two-step
analysis of Cone's claim. It first analyzed whether the state court's decision was
contrary to applicable federal law and then addressed whether the law was
unreasonably applied to the facts of the case.2'
In Wil/iani v TaIor, the Supreme Court stated that to meet the "contrary
to" standard of S 2254(d), a defendant must show that the state court erred in
one of two possible ways.28 First, a defendant mayobtain relief if the state court
reached a conclusion of law opposite to that reached by the Supreme Court. 9
Alternatively, if the facts of a case are materially indistiAguishable from those in
a United States Supreme Court precedent, and the state court comes to an
opposite conclusion from that of the Supreme Court, a defendant may be
entitled to relief?
The Court analyzed both Sridlvad. and COw to determine whether the
state court's denial of Cone's appeal was contraryto applicable federal law.31 In
Srid/zrg the Supreme Court set forth a two-part test for use in determining
when a defendant's counsel has performed so ineffectively that the defendant's
conviction or sentence should be reversed."2 If a defendant can prove that his
counsel's "representation fell below an objective standard of reasonableness" and
that "there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel's unprofessional
errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different," then a defendant
21. Cm 243 F.3d at 979; sw United States v. Gronic, 466 US. 648, 659 (1984) (describing
the circumstances under whichSadmiprejudice need not be shown); Stri na 466 US. at 688,
694.
22. Bell v. Cone, 122 S. O. 663, 663 (men.) (2001) (grating writ of certioran).
23. Bd4 122 S. 0. at 1850.
24. 1d; seeStri&an4 466 US. at 688,694; Ovir, 466 US. at 659.
25. Bd4 122 S. C. at 1850, sw28 US.C S 2254(d) (stating that misapplication of federal law
is cause for granting writ of habeas corpus).
26. Bd 122 S. O. at 1850, 1852.
27. 529 US. 362 (2000).
28. Williams v. Taylor, 529 US. 362,405 (2000); sw 28 US.C S 2254(d).
29. Wi~a, 529 US. at 405.
30. Id
31. Bd, 122 S. 0. at 1850-51.
32. Id at 1850, see Stidwar 466 US. at 687 (stating two-par test for reversing conviction
based on ineffective assistance of counseD).
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may be granted relief." In C~rc the Court outlined three circumstances in
which a defendant need not show the prejudice usually required by StidlanLX
They are as follows: (1) when a defendant is completely denied counsel at a
critical stage of the proceeding; (2) if "counsel entirelyfails to subject the prosecu-
tion's case to meaningful adversarial testing;" and (3) in those circumstances in
which counsel is called upon to render assistance when "competent counsel very
likely could not."35
Cone argued that his situation fell within the second Crrc exception to
Strid&mzl In support of this argument, Cone pointed to his attorney's failure
to present mitigating evidence and his waiver of dosing argument at the sentenc-
ing hearing." The Court rejected this argument and stated that to fall within the
second Cmnicexception, a defendant must demonstrate that his attorneyentirely
failed to test the prosecution's case." The Court found that Cone's situation did
not meet the requirements of the second Cmric exception because Cone only
contended that his attorney failed at certain points during his sentencing
hearing. 9 In addition, the Court found that the alleged errors of Cone's counsel
were of the same type as those to which it had applied Stri&Lwid in the past.'
After considering these factors, the Court concluded that the state court correctly
applied Stwklawdito Cone's claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, and thus
the state court's denial of Cone's appeal was not contraryto the applicable federal
law.41
The Supreme Court then addressed whether the state court applied SLide-
/ad to Cone's claim in an objectively reasonable manner.42 In Strikk=ar the
Court stated that "counsel is strongly presumed 'to have rendered adequate
assistance and made all significant decisions in the exercise of reasonable profes-
sional judgment."43 In order to overcome the strong presumption that counsel
performed professionally, a defendant must show that competent attorneys
would agree that trial counsel's action or inaction could not be considered
33. Be, 122 S. Ct. at 1850 (quoting Soi&/ari 466 US. at 688, 694).
34. Id at 1850-51; sw CttO, 466 US. at 658-60 (stating circumstances in which defendant
is not required to meet Sni&/zistandards).
35. Bd 122 S. Ct. at 1851 (quoting Cr* 466 US. at 659).
36. Id at 1851.
37. Id at 1854 (Stevens, J., dissenting). Cone pointed to a letter of forgiveness from the
victim's sister, his loving relationship with his family, the tragic deaths of his brother and fiancee,
his drug addiction, and his experiences in Vietnam as mitigating evidence that his attomeydid not
present at the sentencing hearing. Id at 1854-56 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
38. Id (quoting Ovi 466 US. at 659).
39. Id at 1851-52.
40. Id
41. B4 122 S. C. at 1852.
42. Id
43. Styiddka 466 US. at 690.
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reasonable trial strategy." After considering the behavior of Cone's attorney, the
Court found that his decision not to present mitigating evidence and his waiver
of dosing argument could have been part of a reasonable trial strategy.45 The
Court concluded that the behavior of Cone's attorney was not so unreasonable
as to overcome the Stidkrpresumption that a defendant received reasonable
representation.*
II Hddi
The United States Supreme Court reversed the Sixth Circuit's grant of
habeas relief4 The Court found that Cone failed to show that the state court's
decision was "contraryto" or "an unreasonable application of" federal lawunder
S 2254(d).
M. A mb is /Aplia7 in Vhm=
It is important to recognize that Beg does not set the standard for adequate
representation in a capital case. Despite the Court's conclusion that Cone's
attomeyprovided adequate representation, a capital defense attomeyshould take
certain steps to ensure that his presentation of mitigating evidence adequately
protects his client.4 An attorney should thoroughly investigate potentially
mitigating evidence, organize this evidence, and consider the potential impact
that presentation of this evidence may have on his client's case. After the guilt
phase, an attorney should determine the correlation between the evidence
presented in the guilt phase with that which he maypresent during the sentencing
hearing.-" Finally, an attomeyshould present the mitigating evidence in a profes-
sional and compelling manner.
A comparison of Wdians and Be/ reinforces the concept that a capital
defense attorney cannot base his trial strategy upon the standard for minimal
effectiveness." In Willam, the United States Supreme Court concluded that a
defendant's attorney provided ineffective representation by failing to present
44. Bd 122 S. C. at 1854.
45. Id Cone's attorney attempted at trial to prove that Cone was not guilty by reason of
insanity. He stated that he believed that the jury would remember the mitigating evidence that he
had presented during the guilt phase because the sentencing hearing took place the day after the
conclusion of the trial He claimed that he did not give a dosing argument because he did not want
the experienced lead attorney for the Government to have the opportunity to give a compelling
argument for death in rebutta. Healso stated that he had pleaded for life in his opening statement,
thus making a plea for life unnecessary in the dosing argument. Id at 1853-54.
46. Id at 1854.
47. Id
48. Id at 1852, 1854; sm 28 U.S.C S 2254(d).
49. BA 122 S. Cc. at 1854.
50. S~eRoss E. Eisenberg, 7beLawrs Rde Wh. deD)9e Sal s Dead,, 14 CAP. DEF.J.
55,67-68 (2001) (discussing the responsibilities of an attorneywhose client seeks death).
51. SeeBd4122S.QC.at1854; Wtdiam,529 US. at391.
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significant and available mitigating evidence at the sentencing hearing.52 Wil-
liams's attorney did not present evidence of Widliams's dismal childhood or low
IQ." His attomeydid not seekprison records documenting Williams's commen-
dations for assisting in the break-up of a drug ring and he did not discover the
testimony of prison guards stating that Williams was unlikely to act violently or
dangerouslyin prison.4 In contrast, Cone's attomeywas found to have provided
adequate representation, although at the sentencing hearing he failed to present
evidence of a drug addiction developed in Vietnam, several personal tragedies,
and testimony from dose friends and family."
Although Ml itself involves a defendant who apparently expected a full
presentation of mitigating evidence, some capital defendants forbid presentation
of mitigating evidence.5' If the attomeyin such a case is not prepared to present
mitigating evidence and the client changes his mind, the attomeywill find himself
unable to present mitigting evidence s Neither Bdlnor WMdha is authorityfor
the proposition that failure to prepare mitigating evidence in such a case is not
ineffective assistance."
Kristen F. Grunewald
52. Wiaim, 529 US. at 390,399.
53. Id at 373 n.4.
54. Id
55. M4 122 S. CL at 1855-56 (Stevens, J., dissenting). Cone's attorney did present some of
this evidence during the guilt phase. Id at 1853.
56. Id at 1851; seedso Ziride v. Conmornweakh, 551 S.E.2d 601,602 (Va. 2001) (involving
defendant who directed counselnot to introduce m-igating evidence); Overtonv. Commonwealth,
539 S.E2d 421,423 (Va. 2000) (irvolving defendant who wrote letter to the trial court asking for
sentence of death).
57. See Eisenberg, s"qra note 50, at 63-64.
58. SwBell, 122 S. CL at 1854; ' dli m, 529 US. at 391.
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